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WILLING ACCOMPLICES:  
GAZPROM & ROSNEFT'S ROLE IN THE TRANSPORT  
AND INDOCTRINATION OF UKRAINE'S CHILDREN

Yale SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH  
*Humanitarian Research Lab*

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Cover image: *Militarization event hosted at Prometheus camp in Sverdlovsk, 19-25 August 2022 for children of Gazprom employees. Sergei Grishin (Mednogorsk LPU MG) is identified as veteran of “border troops” and Chairman of the Trade Union Organization of the Mednogorsk LU MG Gazprom Transgaz Ekaterinburg, overseeing child in military fatigues shooting pistol. || This photograph has been edited from the original to blur any distinguishing features on the child. No other changes have been made. Source: VZ019 redacted for protection purposes, available for verification and accountability mechanisms.*

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# I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## 1A. INTRODUCTION

The Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab (Yale HRL) concludes with high confidence that at least two Russian state-owned oil and gas companies – Gazprom and Rosneft, including their subsidiaries and trade unions – underwrote and facilitated the transportation and/or re-education of approximately 2,158 children from Russia-occupied Ukraine between 2022–2025. This study is the first definitive public proof of these companies’ involvement in Russia’s systematic campaign of child deportation and indoctrination.

This report’s findings have added significance given the Trump Administration’s decision on 12 March 2026 to temporarily authorize the sale, delivery, or offloading of Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products that were already loaded onto shipping vessels in an attempt to stabilize global energy markets amid disruptions from the Iran war. This time-limited waiver of General License 134, approved by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), will remain in effect for 30 days, from March 12 to April 11, 2026, and applies only to cargoes already loaded and in transit, including crude and petroleum products of Gazprom and Rosneft. As a result, Gazprom and Rosneft are the first known Russian Federation-affiliated corporate entities directly implicated in Russia’s alleged war crimes related to child deportation that are currently making money from U.S. consumer spending at the time of this publication.

Children from Ukraine were taken to at least six camps in Russia and Russia-occupied Ukraine: (1) “Prometheus” camp, (2) “Signal” camp, (3) “Kubanskaya Niva” camp, (4) “Art-Quest” camp, (5) “Sputnik” camp, and (6) the “A.V. Kazakevich Children’s Health Camp.” Yale HRL previously located all six camps in its September 2025 report, “Ukraine’s Stolen Children: Inside Russia’s Network of Re-education and Militarization.”<sup>1</sup>

Gazprom- and Rosneft-controlled subsidiaries and trade unions helped facilitate and sponsor the transport and re-education of Ukraine’s children through direct ownership of camps, provision of camp vouchers, and coordination of pro-Russia indoctrination. Three of the camps previously identified by Yale HRL were owned by Gazprom subsidiaries when children from Ukraine were present at these facilities. As of March 2026, two of the three camps still are owned by Gazprom subsidiaries. The third camp previously owned by a Gazprom subsidiary was listed for sale as of January 2025. The three other camps to which Ukraine’s children were taken are privately owned (see Section III).

This report focuses on Gazprom and Rosneft’s involvement in the period following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It is worth noting that Gazprom and Rosneft have sponsored children from Russia to attend camps since as early as 2008. Additionally, at least 15 children from Ukraine were taken by Gazprom to the “Kubanskaya Niva” camp in 2015, which is owned by Gazprom subsidiary Gazprom Dobycha Urengoy.<sup>2</sup>

Gazprom and Rosneft significantly increased their support to transport and re-educate Ukraine’s children since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In 2022, Gazprom subsidiaries and Russia’s trade union organizations collaborated to send at least 1,200 children from occupied Ukraine to camps in Russia and/or Russia-occupied Ukraine.<sup>3</sup> The following year, Gazprom subsidiaries provided more than a thousand vouchers for children from Ukraine to attend pro-Russia camps between 2022–2023.<sup>4</sup> The Gazprom-provided vouchers enabled children to attend the camps for free or reduced costs. HRL has no information related to what context consent was provided or not provided in all cases identified below. However, HRL has established in previous reports that while many children were taken to camps in Russia and Russia-occupied Crimea with the consent of their parents, other children have been sent to camps without the consent of their parents and/or consent originally obtained was invalidated.

This study does not assess Gazprom and Rosneft’s legal liability for its involvement in the Kremlin-led effort to deport, indoctrinate, abduct, and in some cases, coercively foster and adopt children from Ukraine either before the full-scale invasion or after it occurred. It does, however, conclude definitively that Gazprom and Rosneft, based on their own public statements, social media posts, and corporate documents, are willing accomplices in activities that have resulted in International Criminal Court-issued arrest warrants for Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Russia’s Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights, Maria Lvova-Belova.

## 1B. KEY FINDINGS

1. Children from Ukraine have been taken to at least six camps in Russia and Russia-occupied Crimea, including three camps owned by Gazprom subsidiaries as recently as 2025.
2. At least 2,158 children from the Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts of Ukraine were taken to camps owned by Gazprom subsidiaries and/or sponsored by Gazprom and Rosneft subsidiaries and trade union organizations to attend these or other pro-Russia camps beginning in 2022.
3. At least 1,072 children from Russia-occupied Ukraine received vouchers from Gazprom subsidiaries and trade union organizations to attend pro-Russia camps in 2022 and 2023.
4. Rosneft Trade Union sponsored 100 children from Ukraine to attend three camps in 2023, including: “Kubanskaya Niva” camp, “Art-Quest” camp, and A.V. Kazakevich Children’s Health camp.
5. Gazprom subsidiaries facilitated the pro-Russia re-education of Ukraine’s children.
6. At least 80% of Russian Federation-affiliated entities involved in the activities described in this report are not currently under sanction by the United States or Europe. Yale HRL identified 44 entities – including camps, oil and gas subsidiaries, trade unions, and high-level company directors – involved in the transport and/or re-education of Ukraine’s children. Among the 44 entities identified, 35 (80%) are not currently subjected to sanctions by the United States or Europe, six entities are subject to sanctions by the United States and European countries, and three entities have an unknown sanction status.

## 1C. METHODOLOGY, LIMITATIONS, AND FURTHER RESEARCH

The methodology for this report relies primarily on the collection and analysis of public statements by individuals and organizations affiliated with the Russian Federation-registered oil and gas companies Gazprom and Rosneft, including their officially incorporated subsidiaries, trade workers unions, and publicly listed officials. Public statements, as defined in this study, include company websites, verified social media accounts connected to the companies, and publicly identified officials, videos, incorporation and ownership documents, and media interviews. For each actor identified in public statements, analysts identified and collected data from Russian incorporation

records including tax identification number, company registration number and associated director. Sanctions status checks were run on Open Sanctions for each of these entities.<sup>5</sup>

Past HRL reports related to Russia’s treatment of children from Ukraine have typically relied on the use of five independent sources of cross-corroborating information for all principal findings of these reports. The five-source standard was used most often to determine the aggregate quantification of children from Ukraine taken to locations in Russia and Russia-occupied Ukraine. This approach, based on the Berkeley Protocol, has prioritized multi-source verification to reach a high confidence finding consistent with the NATO Admiralty standard for intelligence analysis. This study differs from past Yale HRL reports on this subject because it reaches its conclusions based on the analysis of primary source materials almost exclusively produced by the two companies in question.

The presence of a large corpus of prima facie inculpatory evidence of Gazprom and Rosneft’s involvement in the movement of children from Ukraine to camps, some of which exposed children to pro-Russia indoctrination, makes this investigation particularly interesting given that the companies themselves confess to having facilitated the movement of these children to camps in Russia and Russia-occupied Crimea. The decision by Yale HRL to forgo the five-source standard was made in this case because of both the overwhelmingly dispositive nature of the primary source material and the detailed descriptions by Gazprom and Rosneft of their intent for children to attend so-called “patriotic re-education” events that the companies publicly avow to have facilitated.

The traditional Yale HRL five-source standard combined with the use of the NATO Admiralty standard is employed in this study to either verify information that cannot either be solely explained by the Gazprom and Rosneft-generated materials or to answer questions raised by the documents themselves. When this traditional Yale HRL approach is used, the specifics of how verification was undertaken are noted in the text itself. Common scenarios where this approach was employed include: confirming the numbers of children who attended camps with the support of the companies; parsing the groups of children funded by vouchers versus those funded through other means; identification of non-Gazprom and Rosneft affiliated accomplices; and determining which cohorts of children from Ukraine were taken to which camps.

## LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

The unique corpus of information available for this study, while significantly probative for investigators, created certain limitations. Three main limitations exist: 1) While HRL can confirm that camps to which Ukraine's children have been taken as recently as 2025 continue to be owned by the companies, the companies' role in indoctrination activities at those or other camps after 2025 cannot be fully determined; 2) The exact places of origin, names, and other demographic information of children from Ukraine moved and/or funded by these companies have not been determined based on available data at this time; and 3) Yale HRL cannot yet conclude whether the companies supported military training for the children from Ukraine that was occurring in at least one facility featured in this study with children from Russia generally contemporaneous to when children from Ukraine were likely present.

This study can conclude that Gazprom and Rosneft, under the leadership of executives financially and politically tied to Putin, willingly aids the Kremlin's agenda to engage in widescale Russification of Ukraine's children. Additional questions are raised that require further investigation to decisively answer. These questions include:

1. Have groups of children from Ukraine not included in this study been taken to either the six facilities named in this report or other sites because of Gazprom and Rosneft efforts since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022?
2. Were any of the other subsidiaries identified in this report, beyond those named, involved in the re-education or transport of children from Ukraine?
3. Did children from Ukraine become subjected to re-education or militarization because of the cooperation agreement between Gazprom Media and Movement of the First documented in this study?
4. What role did military training and/or militarized education play in the curriculum of Gazprom- and Rosneft-supported indoctrination programs and/or activities that took place at Gazprom- and Rosneft-owned camp facilities?

## II. BACKGROUND | UNDERSTANDING GAZPROM AND ROSNEFT'S ROLE IN PUTIN'S RUSSIA

Gazprom and Rosneft are more than oil and gas companies in Putin's Russia – they are essential integers in how Putin obtained power, maintains control, and funds his war machine that is currently waging war against Ukraine. According to a 2024 study by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Russia's oil and gas industry revenues have accounted for 30–50% of its total federal budget revenue over the past decade.<sup>6</sup> On average, the sector contributes approximately 20% of the country's GDP. Oil and gas exports from Russia are critical to how it weathers external shocks, such as sanctions, providing a consistent, undisrupted source of revenue to finance domestic social obligations and imports.<sup>7</sup>

The Russian energy sector provides critical financial support and geopolitical leverage that sustains and enables Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Since February 2022, Russia has earned over one trillion euros from the sale of its fossil fuel resources, including oil, gas, and coal.<sup>8</sup> Russia's fossil fuel export market creates a substantial fiscal bridge between itself and the European Union. In 2025, the value of the European Union's Russian fossil fuel imports surpassed the 18.7 billion euros of financial aid it contributed to Ukraine in 2024.<sup>9</sup>

Rosneft and Gazprom are among the largest corporations in Russia. The Russian state holds a controlling stake in each corporation through direct investment and investment through a state-sponsored holding company, ensuring decision making power lies firmly with the Kremlin.<sup>10</sup> Some of Russia's most influential political figures and Putin's closest allies lead both companies. Alexei Miller, Gazprom's current CEO, is a long-term ally of Vladimir Putin and was instrumental in helping Russia's government gain control over the company in the early 2000s.<sup>11</sup>

Viktor Zubkov, Chair of the Board at Gazprom, was Prime Minister of Russia under President Putin from 2007–2008.<sup>12</sup> Igor Sechin, CEO of Rosneft, widely considered Russia's second-most powerful man, is a long-standing ally of Putin, under which he served as Deputy Prime Minister in 2008.<sup>13</sup> These close ties and immense financial holdings position Rosneft and Gazprom as two nexus points in an extensive reward network for Kremlin insiders and Putin allies, ensuring individual loyalty to Putin's agenda.

Gazprom is the second largest producer and exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Russia.<sup>14</sup> Rosneft is the leader of Russia's oil sector and Russia's largest taxpayer.<sup>15</sup> Both companies' operational structures rely on the management of several hundred specialized subsidiary companies. Yale HRL defines a subsidiary company as a legal entity owned or controlled by a parent company,

whereby the parent company owns 50% or more of its shares giving it a controlling stake in the subsidiary.<sup>16</sup> All subsidiaries named in this report are wholly owned by Gazprom, which means that the subsidiary's stock is solely owned by the parent company, thereby controlling all its operations.<sup>17</sup>

Yale HRL also identifies that Gazprom and Rosneft trade unions have been directly involved in activities related to Ukraine's children. While these unions are intended to act independently of the companies whose workers they ostensibly represent, independent scholarly assessments of trade union freedom in the Russian Federation tell a different story. Trade unions in Russia face significant interference from employers and the state and are often unable to act independently of the company to which they are affiliated.<sup>18</sup>

Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, both Gazprom and Rosneft have been comprehensively sanctioned by the United States, the European Union, Ukraine, and other countries. Sanction regimes have targeted their operations, individual executives, and foreign financing. These already severe sanctions were only further strengthened in response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, continuing to be further ratcheted up until as recently as October 2025.<sup>19</sup> However, on 12 March 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump announced the lifting of oil and gas sanctions against Russia for an initial thirty days to alleviate the pressure on oil prices caused by the war in Iran.<sup>20</sup>

This is the second time Yale HRL has documented corporate entities involved in Russia's program of deportation and re-education of Ukraine's children. In December 2023, Yale HRL released a report on the role that OJSC Belaruskali– Belarus' state-owned potash company– played in Russia's and Belarus' deportation of Ukraine's children to Belarus. For more information, see Yale HRL's report, "Belarus' Collaboration with Russia in the Systematic Deportation of Ukraine's children."<sup>21</sup> The US government announced an agreement to lift all remaining sanctions on Belaruskali, among other previously sanctioned Belarusian entities, on 19 March 2026.<sup>22</sup>

### III. TIMELINE OF EVENTS

This section outlines the timeline of Gazprom and Rosneft’s stated involvement in the movement of children from Ukraine. Gazprom and Rosneft have sponsored attendance at these camps for children from Russia since as early as 2008; the first documented instance of their involvement vis-a-vis children from Ukraine dates to 2015, when at least 15 children from Ukraine were taken to Kubanskaya Niva, a Gazprom subsidiary-owned camp.<sup>23</sup> The chronology of movements of specific groups of children presented below is based on the public statements made and documents released by the relevant corporate entities themselves.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Gazprom subsidiaries and trade union organizations significantly increased their involvement in facilitating the transfer and re-education of Ukraine’s children. In 2022, the Chairman of the Oil, Gas, Construction Trade Union of Russia, Alexander Kochagin, stated that his organization collaborated with Gazprom subsidiary “Gazprom Dobycha Yamburg Trade Union” to “provide recreation” for 1,200 children from the so-called DPR and LPR to be sent to camps in Russia’s southern region.<sup>24</sup>

At least three groups of children—the earliest documented instances of the companies’ involvement since the full-scale invasion—were taken to three camps in the summer and fall of 2022, including two camps owned by Gazprom subsidiaries. Gazprom Dobycha Nadym provided vouchers to 47 children from Donetsk oblast, who were taken to “Kubanskaya Niva” – a camp owned by Gazprom Dobycha Urengoy.<sup>25</sup>

Gazprom Transgaz Ekaterinburg, which owns the “Prometheus” camp, reported that 200 children from Donetsk oblast were taken to its camp in the summer and fall of 2022.<sup>26</sup> Gazprom Mezhrefiongaz Rostov-on-Don and Gazprom Mezhrefiongaz Moscow organized for 30 children from Donetsk oblast to go to an unspecified facility in the Rostov region in the summer of 2022.<sup>27</sup> While the article does not state which facility children are taken to, the available photo features a building with a distinct yellow façade that matches that of the Children’s camp “Sputnik.”<sup>28</sup>

At least 750 children were taken to 5 locations in 2023. Gazprom Transgaz Ekaterinburg stated that nearly 500 children from Donetsk oblast were taken to the “Prometheus” camp in summer 2023.<sup>29</sup> The company further stated that a “special program” with “patriotic education initiatives” was prepared for 200 children from Donetsk who were taken to the camp in fall 2023.<sup>30</sup> In June 2023, 150 children from Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts were taken to the “Kubanskaya Niva” camp.<sup>31</sup>

Rosneft’s Interregional Trade Union sponsored 100 children from Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts to be taken to the “Art-Quest,” “A.V. Kazakevich Children’s Health Camp,” and the “Kubanskaya Niva” camp in summer 2023.<sup>32</sup> In September 2023, Gazprom Trade Union stated that 1,025 children from the Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts had been provided with vouchers to be taken to camps in 2023.<sup>33</sup>

These movements of children to camps are corroborated by an 18 April 2024 resolution by the Trade Union Presidium of the All-Russian Professional Union of Oil, Gas, and Construction Industry Workers. The resolution states that the Gazprom Trade Union, “...initiated and coordinated a campaign” in which Gazprom subsidiaries and trade union organizations provided 1,025 vouchers for children from the [so-called] Donetsk People’s Republic, Luhansk People’s Republic, and Zaporizhzhia to attend camps in 2023.<sup>34</sup>

In summer 2025, at least 208 children from Donetsk oblast were taken to the “Signal” camp.<sup>35</sup> Children from Donetsk were also reportedly taken to the “Prometheus” camp in July 2025.<sup>36</sup>

#### USE OF VOUCHERS

Gazprom subsidiaries and trade unions issued 1,072 vouchers for children from Ukraine between 2022 and 2023. Gazprom Dobycha Nadym claimed they provided 47 vouchers to fund children from Donetsk, who were taken to the “Kubanskaya Niva” camp in 2022.<sup>37</sup> Gazprom subsidiaries and trade unions issued the majority of vouchers—1,025 (95.6%)—in 2023.<sup>38</sup>

Yale HRL was unable to confirm whether all 1,025 children for whom camp vouchers were provided in 2023 were taken to camps that year. Critically, based on the available information, Yale HRL cannot determine to high confidence that there is no overlap between those who were issued vouchers in 2023 and those who were confirmed to have been taken to camps in 2023. To mitigate the risk of double counting, HRL therefore did not include the 1,025 children to whom vouchers were provided in 2023 in its aggregate 2,158 total. This aggregate total therefore represents the most conservative estimate and highest-confidence baseline number of children reliably shown to have been taken to camps as a result of actions by Gazprom and Rosneft and/or taken to camps owned by Gazprom subsidiaries. However, this aggregate number is likely significantly higher. If each of the 1,025 children to whom vouchers were provided in 2023 were taken to camps in addition to the 750 children already confirmed to have been taken that same year, then it is possible that at least 3,183 children from Ukraine—rather than 2,158 children—may have been taken to camps between 2022-2025.

## IV. CAMP FACILITIES & RE-EDUCATION ACTIVITIES

Approximately 2,158 children from Ukraine were taken to at least six camps owned by Gazprom subsidiaries and/or otherwise supported by Gazprom and Rosneft subsidiaries and trade unions to attend camps in Russia and Russia-occupied Ukraine between 2022 and 2025.<sup>i</sup> At least 1,200 of these children were taken to camps in 2022, 750 children were taken to camps in 2023, and 208 children were taken to camps in 2025.

### CAMPS

The following section provides a brief overview of the six camps— four of which are in Russia and two of which are in occupied-Crimea— to which Ukraine’s children were taken between 2022–2025. Further research is needed to identify whether additional groups of children from Ukraine were taken to these or other facilities between 2022 and the present.

Children from Donetsk and Luhansk were taken to three camps owned by Gazprom subsidiaries: the (1) “Prometheus” camp in Sverdlovsk oblast, the (2) “Signal” camp in Krasnodar Krai, and the (3) “Kubanskaya Niva” camp in Krasnodar Krai. Gazprom Transgaz Ekaterinburg claimed that nearly 700 children from Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts were taken to the “Prometheus” camp between 2022-2023.<sup>39</sup> They further claimed that children from Donetsk that had been taken to the “Prometheus” camp in fall 2023 were exposed to “patriotic education” at the camp.<sup>40</sup>

Children from Donetsk were reportedly taken to the Prometheus camp in July 2025.<sup>41</sup> Additional research is needed to determine the number of children taken to the “Prometheus” camp in 2025. At least two groups of children were sent to the “Signal” camps in 2022 and 2025, respectively. In June 2025, 208 children from Donetsk were reportedly taken to the “Signal” camp. Those transported in 2025 mark the most recent transfer of children taken to camps owned by Gazprom subsidiaries identified by Yale HRL.<sup>42</sup>

It is worth noting that 700 children from Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Russia were taken to the “Kubanskaya Niva” camp in summer 2023.<sup>43</sup> However, HRL was unable to identify how many children in this

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i. This aggregate total, in part, uses approximate numbers published in *prima facie* statements issued by Gazprom subsidiaries. The first statement, published by Gazprom Dobycha Yamburg Trade Union, quotes the Chairman of the Oil, Gas, Construction Trade Union of Russia who claims to have collaborated with Gazprom Dobycha Yamburg Trade Union to “provide recreation” for 1,200 children from the [so-called] DPR and LPR.

This aggregate total also includes the numbers in a *prima facie* statement published by Gazprom Transgaz Ekaterinburg stating that “nearly 500” children were taken to the “Prometheus” camp in 2023.

group were taken from the three Russia-occupied oblasts in Ukraine. In June 2022, Russia’s Ministry of Education reportedly sponsored and/or facilitated sending 150 children from Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to the Kubanskaya Niva camp and 77 children from Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to the Signal camp.<sup>44</sup>

Educational psychologists were allegedly present at both “Kubanskaya Niva” and “Signal” camps; the extent of their involvement remains under investigation.<sup>45</sup> Yale HRL has extensively documented the role that Russia’s Ministry of Education has played in the deportation, re-education, and adoption of Ukraine’s children—including through management of the website where children from Ukraine were listed for adoption as though they were from Russia—as well as the role that Russia’s state-affiliated psychologists have played in the unlawful adoption and fostering of Ukraine’s children.<sup>46</sup>

As previously stated, the Rosneft International Trade Union claimed to have organized for 100 children from the Donetsk, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts to be placed in three camps in Russia and Russia-occupied Crimea, including the “Kubanskaya Niva” camp in Russia, the “Art-Quest” camp in Russia-occupied Crimea, and the “A.V. Kazakevich Children’s Health Camp” in Russia-occupied Crimea in 2023.<sup>47</sup> Yale HRL was unable to determine how many children were taken to each facility.

Two of these camps—“Art-Quest” and “A.V. Kazakevich Children’s Health Camp”—are privately owned, as is the “Sputnik” camp in Rostov oblast. “Sputnik” is the only privately owned camp identified by Yale HRL to which Gazprom subsidiaries sent Ukraine’s children. Gazprom Mezhrefiongaz Moscow LLC stated that they collaborated with Gazprom Mezhrefiongaz Rostov-on-Don LLC and the “All People’s Front”—a political party aligned with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin—to send 30 children from Donetsk oblast to the “Sputnik” camp.<sup>48</sup>

### CAMP OWNERSHIP

This section provides an overview on the entities—including both Gazprom subsidiaries and private individuals— that currently own or have previously owned the six camps to which Ukraine’s children were taken. Ownership determinations were made by Yale HRL based on public documents released by the relevant Russian Federation authorities.

#### The “Prometheus” camp

The “Prometheus” camp in Sverdlovsk oblast is owned by Gazprom Transgaz Ekaterinburg LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Gazprom PJSC.<sup>49</sup> While there is no Russian incorporation data available on this facility, its social media page, which is still active as of March 2026, states

it is owned by the Gazprom subsidiary.<sup>50</sup> The exact date when the camp came under the ownership of the Gazprom subsidiary is unknown. However, the camp has been owned by Gazprom since at least 2008 based on reporting on Gazprom’s own website of “holidays” organized for children of its employees.<sup>51</sup>

### The “Signal” camp

The “Signal” camp is currently owned by Gazprom subsidiary “Gazprom Dobycha Yamburg LLC.”<sup>52</sup> Based on news reports published on Gazprom Dobycha Yamburg’s website, the facility has been owned by Gazprom since at least 2019.<sup>53</sup>

### The “Kubanskaya Niva” camp

The Kubanskaya Niva camp is owned by two companies: (1) “Gazprom Dobycha Urengoy”, and (2) “Vityaz Health and Recreation Center LLC”– a subsidiary of “Gazprom Dobycha Urengoy.”<sup>54</sup> The facility has been under ownership of Gazprom subsidiaries since at least 2015, when the company reported it had facilitated the transfer of children from Ukraine to this facility.<sup>55</sup> According to the Russian news outlet RBC, Gazprom listed this facility for sale in January 2025.<sup>56</sup> Yale HRL is unable to identify whether this facility has been sold or whether it is still owned by Gazprom subsidiaries.

### The “Sputnik” camp

The “Sputnik” camp in Rostov oblast was founded by entrepreneur Igor Nikolaevich Shapovalenko.<sup>57</sup> According to Russian incorporation data, Shapovalenko is also registered as a founder of a sanatorium in the Rostov region, called Sanatorium Zvezda.<sup>58</sup>

### The “Art-Quest” camp

The “Art-Quest” camp was founded by Alexander Ivanovich Ryabinin, who–according to Russia’s occupation administration– was the Chairman of the Artek International Children’s Center Support Fund as of 2017.<sup>59</sup> Artek International Children’s Center, also located in occupied Crimea, is one of the most prominent camps to which Ukraine’s children have been sent and exposed to re-education and militarization.<sup>60</sup> His current involvement in the fund and camp is unknown.

### The “A.V” Kazakevich Children’s Health Camp”

The “A.V” Kazakevich Children’s Health Camp” in occupied Crimea is owned by foreign holding company Ravilda Holdings Ltd, which is registered in Cyprus.<sup>61</sup> The company does not have an apparent affiliation to oil and gas companies. However, its registration is unusual for a company owning a children’s camp in Crimea and warrants further investigation.



Figure 1. Event held August 19-25 2022 at **Prometheus camp**. Children identified as family of Gazprom Ekaterinburg employees. 47 children visible in military fatigues for culmination of militarization event, 6 adults in military attire, **Gazprom Transgaz Ekaterinburg** logo backdrop for photo.

*This photograph has been edited from the original to blur any distinguishing features on children. No other changes have been made. Source: VZ014 redacted for protection purposes, available for verification and accountability mechanisms.*

## RE-EDUCATION

HRL defines re-education as the promotion of cultural, historical, societal, and so-called “patriotic” narratives that align and serve the interests of Russia. This curriculum also serves to minimize or erase narratives promoting Ukraine’s history, cultural identity, and language. Below are instances HRL investigators found that meet the definition of re-education provided above.

Gazprom subsidiaries Gazprom Transgaz Ekaterinburg and Gazprom Media Holding JSC subjected Ukraine’s children to patriotic re-education in at least three instances between 2023-2024. In 2023, Gazprom Transgaz Ekaterinburg– who owns the “Prometheus” camp– claimed that 200 children from Donetsk were taken to the “Prometheus” camp in fall 2023, where a “special program” with “patriotic education initiatives” was prepared for them.<sup>62</sup> Yale HRL was unable to identify the types of material or narratives to which the children were exposed.

Gazprom Transgaz Ekaterinburg posted images and videos of an event it organized where children were being militarized at the “Prometheus” camp in August 2022. At the event, children reportedly performed military drills, hand-to-hand combat, grenade throwing, and rifle shooting.<sup>63</sup> This event was reportedly organized in collaboration with the Gazprom Ekaterinburg Trade Union and attended by members of the Federal Security Service of Russia for the Chelyabinsk region.<sup>64</sup> Additional research is needed to identify whether children from Ukraine were present at this event or at the “Prometheus camp” at the time of this event.

Gazprom Media Holding JSC — a major Gazprom subsidiary that owns and controls large parts of Russia’s media landscape — organized events for children from Donetsk that had been taken to camps in 2023 and 2024. The camps where these events occurred are not included in the six camps identified in this report and remain under investigation. In June 2024, Gazprom Media stated that they organized an event at a St. Petersburg camp to which children from Donetsk were taken, where the children met with pro-Russia propagandists and military bloggers Alexander Malkevich and Yuriy Podolyaka.<sup>65</sup> Alexander Malkevich was sanctioned by the United States Government in 2018, while Podolyaka remains unsanctioned by the U.S.<sup>66</sup>

In May 2023, Gazprom Media Holding JSC and Russia’s Movement of the First signed a cooperation agreement to support patriotic events and initiatives.<sup>67</sup> The Movement of the First is a public-governmental youth movement, founded in 2022, that exposes children from Russia and Russia-occupied Ukraine to military training and military education.<sup>68</sup> Yale HRL previously reported Movement of the First’s militarization of children from Ukraine in its September 2025 report, “Ukraine’s Stolen Children: Inside Russia’s Network of Re-education and Militarization.”<sup>69</sup>

Yale HRL has not yet identified the cooperation agreement, nor can it determine what the agreement stipulates. It is unknown if children from Ukraine were exposed to re-education or militarization as a result of this cooperation agreement. Additional research is needed to determine whether Gazprom Media helped subject Ukraine’s children to re-education at the six camps identified in this report or if Ukraine’s children underwent militarization because of the 2023 cooperation agreement between Gazprom Media Holding and Movement of the First.

Gazprom Dobycha Urengoy allocated funds for children from Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia to be taken to the “Kubanskaya Niva” camp in summer 2023.<sup>70</sup> While at the facility, children at the camp underwent “patriotic education and development of moral and ethical values.”<sup>71</sup> These activities reportedly occurred while children from Ukraine were at the facility, although HRL is unable to confirm that children from Ukraine sent to this pro-Russia camp underwent re-education.



Figure 2. Militarization event hosted at **Prometheus camp** in Sverdlovsk, 19-25 August 2022 for children of Gazprom employees. **Sergei Grishin** (Mednogorsk LPU MG) is identified as veteran of “border troops” and Chairman of the Trade Union Organization of the Mednogorsk LU MG Gazprom Transgaz Ekaterinburg, overseeing child in military fatigues shooting pistol.

*This photograph has been edited from the original to blur any distinguishing features on the child. No other changes have been made. Source: VZ019 redacted for protection purposes, available for verification and accountability mechanisms.*

## V. CHAIN OF COMMAND

The findings presented in this report illustrate a level of involvement by actors whose connections run all the way up to Putin’s most trusted inner circle. It reveals a coherent campaign of action by entities wholly controlled by two of Russia’s largest companies and their executives, without whose authorization this could not have happened. The following section provides an overview of this network.

The two oligarchs who respectively control Gazprom and Rosneft, Alexei Miller and Igor Sechin, are two of Vladimir Putin’s closest and most trusted advisers, a key part of the rationale for which they were placed under individual sanctions by the United States and Europe in response to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.<sup>72</sup> As heads of these corporations, these individuals have full control over the strategic direction and operations of these companies and their subsidiaries. Neither of the two individuals have made public statements about the abduction of children from Ukraine identified by HRL at the time of this publication.

This investigation reveals a sprawling network of first and second-tier subsidiaries and trade unions acting under the direct control of their parent companies but outside of public scrutiny. Despite their relationship to Gazprom and Rosneft, the majority of the 44 entities – camps, companies, trade unions, and their directors – identified in this investigation are currently not sanctioned. All companies named in this report are either solely owned by Gazprom or owned by a company that is solely owned by Gazprom.

These Gazprom subsidiaries and trade unions self-reported their own involvement in the transport of children from Ukraine to camps they themselves own, allocated funds to facilitate this transport, or organized re-education activities for these children. The subsidiaries involved in camp ownership are Gazprom Transgaz Ekaterinburg, which currently owns Health Camp “Prometheus”, Gazprom Dobycha Yamburg and Gazprom Dobycha Yamburg trade union, which currently own Children’s Health Centre “Signal”, Gazprom Dobycha Urgengoy and its own subsidiary, Vityaz Health and Recreation Center, which owned the Children’s Centre “Kubanskaya Niva” until at least January 2025.<sup>73</sup>

Subsidiaries and their trade unions — including Rosneft’s Interregional Trade Union — played an instrumental role by allocating funds or otherwise stating that they organized the transport of children from Ukraine to these facilities.<sup>74</sup> These companies include Mezhhregiongaz Moscow LLC and Mezhhregiongaz Rostov LLC, two companies owned by Gazprom subsidiary Gazprom Mezhhregiongaz, as well as Gazprom Dobycha Nadym and its trade union.<sup>75</sup>

Gazprom Media Holding JSC, the Gazprom subsidiary which owns large parts of Russian media, has been actively involved in youth propaganda targeted at children from Ukraine. The events the company itself claimed to have organized in 2023 and 2024, the latter of which was attended by military bloggers Yuriy Podolyaka and Alexander Malkevich, underscore the extent of Gazprom’s reach in the lives of these children.<sup>76</sup> Alexander Malkevich, a close associate of former Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin, is a key figure who has supported the establishment of pro-Russia news outlets in Russia-occupied territories of Ukraine.<sup>77</sup> Gazprom Media’s cooperation with pro-Russia youth organization Movement of the First since 2023 further illustrates Gazprom’s complicity in the indoctrination of these children despite increased international scrutiny.<sup>78</sup>

## VI. CONCLUSION

Russia’s systematic campaign to deport, indoctrinate, and in some cases, foster or adopt children from Ukraine has long been shown by Yale HRL to integrally rely on a complex network of federal, regional, and local governmental agencies working in concert with non-governmental groups to function. What this report demonstrates for the first time is that Gazprom and Rosneft, two of Russia’s most critical oil and gas companies, are willing accomplices in this interconnected web of diverse entities.

Gazprom and Rosneft, with the cooperation of their subsidiaries and trade unions, intentionally engaged in logistical planning, funding, and operational coordination that directly facilitated the so-called “patriotic re-education” of Ukraine’s children. These activities took place inside Russia and the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, often at camps still owned and run by these corporations. The evidence for the findings presented in this study is nearly entirely derived from the public statements, videos, social media, and other documents generated by Gazprom and Rosneft themselves to promote the pro-Russia indoctrination of children from Ukraine.

The Trump Administration’s March 2026 temporary waiver of previously imposed U.S. sanctions on Russia’s oil and gas sector—a market dominated by Gazprom and Rosneft—serves to financially reward companies that have actively supported Putin’s systematic campaign to Russify Ukraine’s children, according to this research. Public estimates suggest that billions of dollars could flow to Russia’s oil and gas industry every month that the sanctions stay suspended, with the majority of these funds reaching these two companies.<sup>79</sup>

Until the sanctions regime targeting Gazprom and Rosneft is reimposed, the United States is now, however inadvertently, aiding and abetting organizations that make up a vital part of Vladimir Putin's industrial-size campaign of abduction, deportation, indoctrination, and coerced adoption of children from Ukraine by Russia. The International Criminal Court indicted Putin and Kremlin official Maria Lvova-Belova in March 2023 for their command responsibility for these alleged crimes. Gazprom and Rosneft will now stand to profit from U.S. policy, despite engaging in what the world correctly calls by their proper names: war crimes.

## VII. APPENDICES

### A. CAMP NAMES & LOCATIONS

NAME: ORIGINAL	NAME: ENGLISH	OBLAST / REGION	LATITUDE	LONGITUDE
ООО ДОК "Сигнал"	000 DOK "Signal"	Krasnodar Krai	44.6527598	37.9298952
Детский оздоровительный центр «Кубанская Нива» ООО «Газпром добыча Уренгой»	Children's Health Center «Kubanskaya Niva» ООО «Gazprom dobycha Urengoy»	Krasnodar Krai	44.972186	37.275044
ООО "Арт-Квест"	000 "Art-Quest"	Autonomous Republic of Crimea	45.1117116	33.5379867
ООО "ГАЗПРОМ ТРАНСГАЗ ЕКАТЕРИНБУРГ" Оздоровительный лагерь "Прометей"	000 "Gazprom Transgaz Ekaterinburg" Health Camp "Prometheus"	Sverdlovsk Oblast	56.4492398	60.7146317
ООО "ДОЛП им. А.В. Казакевича"	000 "DOLP im. A.V. Kazakevich"	Autonomous Republic of Crimea	44.852329	33.600356
ДОК "Спутник"	DOK "Sputnik"	Rostov Oblast	47.1509151	38.4438323

### B. ENTITIES IDENTIFIED

NAME: ORIGINAL	NAME: ENGLISH	TAX IDENTIFICATION NO. (TIN)	UNDER SANCTIONS
ООО "ГАЗПРОМ ТРАНСГАЗ ЕКАТЕРИНБУРГ" Оздоровительный лагерь "Прометей"	000 "Gazprom Transgaz Ekaterinburg" Health Camp "Prometheus"	N/A	N/A
ООО ДОК "Сигнал"	000 DOK "Signal"	2304044300	N
Головачев Александр Михайлович	Golovachev, Alexander Mikhailovich	610206512654	N
Родионов Андрей Викторович	Rodionov, Andrey Viktorovich	502007599430	N
Очередько Нина Алексеевна	Ocheredko, Nina Alekseevna	230800524015	N
Детский оздоровительный центр «Кубанская Нива» ООО «Газпром добыча Уренгой»	Children's Health Center «Kubanskaya Niva» ООО «Gazprom dobycha Urengoy»	N/A	N/A
ДОК "Спутник"	DOK "Sputnik"	6123111953	N
ООО "Арт-Квест"	000 "Art-Quest"	9107036165	N
ООО "ДОЛП им. А.В. Казакевича"	000 "DOLP im. A.V. Kazakevich"	9104000322	N
Гонова Наталья Иннокентьевна	Gonova, Natalia Inokentevna	N/A	N/A
Кривоклякин Сергей Анатольевич	Krivoklyakin, Sergey Anatolievich	615402915553	N
Белюсов Владислав Викторович	Belousov, Vladislav Viktorovich	544312748870	N

NAME: ORIGINAL	NAME: ENGLISH	TAX IDENTIFICATION NO. (TIN)	UNDER SANCTIONS
Луценко Максим Петрович	Lutsenko, Maxim Petrovich	910408189554	N
Ооо "Газпром Трансгаз Екатеринбург"	ООО "Gazprom Transgaz Ekaterinburg"	6608007434	N
Ооо "Газпром Добыча Ямбург"	ООО "Gazprom Dobycha Yamburg"	8904034777	Y
ООО "Газпром добыча Уренгой"	ООО "Gazprom Dobycha Urengoy"	8904034784	Y
Шаповаленко Игорь Николаевич	Shapovalenko, Igor Nikolaevich	615401086014	N
Рябинин Александр Иванович	Ryabinin, Alexander Ivanovich	771671237691	N
РАВИЛДА ХОЛДИНГС ЛТД	RAVILDA HOLDINGS LTD	C219102	N
Крюков Алексей Вячеславович	Kryukov, Alexey Vyacheslavovich	110700570870	N
Шалимов Сергей Анатольевич	Shalimov, Sergey Anatolyevich	561004166473	N
АНДРЕЙ АЛЕКСАНДРОВИЧ КАСЬЯНЕНКО	Kasyanenko, Andrey Alexandrovich	340700454500	N
Корякин Александр Юрьевич	Koryakin, Alexander Yuryevich	890300324485	N
ΣΑΝΤΡΑ ΕΛΕΝΑ ΧΑΡΑΛΑΜΠΟΥΣ	Sandra Elena Charalambous		N
ППО "ГАЗПРОМ ДОБЫЧА ЯМБУРГ ПРОФСОЮЗ"	РРО "Gazprom Dobycha Yamburg Profsoyuz"	8904017203	N
Алимов Руслан Маратович	Alimov, Ruslan Maratovich	582501371491	N
ООО "ЛОК "ВИТЯЗЬ"	ООО "LOK Vityaz"	2301088612	N
Саранчук Роман Викторович	Saranchuk, Roman Viktorovich	890406077050	N
ООО "ГАЗПРОМ ДОБЫЧА НАДЫМ"	ООО "Gazprom Dobycha Nadym"	8903019871	Y
Щёголев Дмитрий Павлович	Shchegolev, Dmitry Pavlovich	260700780367	N
Игорь Васильевич Мельников	Igor Vasilievich Melnikov	890300762376	N
Нефтегазстройпрофсоюз России	Oil, Gas, Construction Trade Union of Russia	7736064944	N
Корчагин Александр Викторович	Korchagin, Alexander Viktorovich	862200351602	N
АО "Газпром-Медиа Холдинг"	Gazprom-Media Holding JSC	7728668727	Y
Жаров Александр Александрович	Zharov, Alexander Alexandrovich	772455243692	Y
ООО "Газпром Межрегионгаз Москва"	ООО "Gazprom Mezhtregiongaz Moskva"	5009033419	N
Тельнов Олег Владимирович	Telnov, Oleg Vladimirovich	100114237800	N
ООО "Газпром Межрегионгаз Ростов-НА-Дону"	Gazprom Mezhtregiongaz Rostov-on-Don LLC	6167049710	N
Бережной Павел Владимирович	Berezhnoy, Pavel Vladimirovich	613001936104	N
Ревенко Владимир Юрьевич	Revenko, Vladimir Yuryevich	616865040558	N
Ооо "Газпром Межрегионгаз"	ООО "Gazprom Mezhtregiongaz"	5003021311	Y
Густов Сергей Вадимович	Gustov, Sergey Vadimovich	780601327233	N
МПО ПАО "НК "Роснефть"	МРО PJSC "NK "Rosneft"	7736243301	N
Караганов Сергей Васильевич	Karaganov, Sergey Vasilievich	772737069178	N

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